September, 2009

Uighurs in Xinjiang
A Critical Inquiry into Chinese Ethno-Religious Policy

KUNG LAP-YAN
Acting Director, Hong Kong Christian Institute
Associate Professor, Divinity School of Chung Chi College,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

Editor’s remark: The July riot in Xinjiang this year has once again caught international attention to the problem of racial conflict between the Han people and ethnic minorities in the Communist China; it became a worldwide focus in the past few months. This essay focuses on the religious and political dimension of the ethnic problem in Xinjiang. It is time to revisit the ethno-religious policy of Communist China through this essay, which casts light on this less discussed yet significant dimension of the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. This essay is an abridged version of a research paper published in 2006.

Ethno-Religious Policy in Xinjiang

　　The Marxist ideological approach to ethnicity tends to view ethnic consciousness, customs and religion as circumstantial, epiphenomenal traits. Ethnic identity will lose its relevance when socio-economic conditions change and it will eventually disappear with the erosion of class- or interest-based differences. The Chinese authorities have however gradually come to realise that this approach is too simplistic and fails to evaluate fully the importance of ethnic identity to a person or a group. In a document entitled Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China the Chinese authorities acknowledge that ‘the long existence of a united multi-ethnic state is the historical basis for practising regional autonomy for ethnic minorities’. The Chinese authorities also acknowledge five characteristics of religion: its long-term existence, its complexity, its ethnic nature, its internationalisation and its character as a people’s movement. This understanding of the nature of religion suggests that religion is destined for long-term coexistence with the Party, and that any thought of eliminating religion is unrealistic. On the subject of the ethnic character of religion or the religious character of ethnicity, Ye Xioawen, then director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, writes that

Religion has the power to unite and mobilise among national minorities . . . . In recent years, we have seen how certain forces and individuals belonging to certain sects frequently used religion to scramble for power and profit, and stir up trouble, even to the point of hurting people . . . . They are using religious fanaticism to divide the people, undermine the unification of motherland and the unity of the various nationalities . . . .

On the national character of religion in Xinjiang he writes that

The major danger of affecting the stability of Xinjiang, especially southern Xinjiang, comes primarily from national division. The danger, in addition to direct sabotage, lies in their ability to use the growing national and religious sentiments and estrangement to cover themselves and avoid punishment, their ability to use errors in our work to sow dissension and stir up trouble, their ability to use the ideological trend of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkismto develop themselves.

It seems, then, that religious policy has to be both tolerant and suppressive in order to direct the ethno-religious minorities to Chinese socialism. My study of the ethno-religious policy in Xinjiang is based on two documents: Regulations on the Administration of Religious Activities in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (1994) and Regulation on the Management of Religious Affairs in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (2001). When we compare the regulations of 2001 with those of 1994, we find that the former are more restrictive, in the following ways:

What is more, ‘national splittism and illegal religious activities’ are undefined in the 2001 regulations. Assessments are to be made by the authorities on the basis of Party instructions, which vary from time to time and are necessarily interpreted in practice in highly subjective ways by local officials. Virtually unlimited power is thus handed to the authorities to investigate or arrest any religious practitioner in disfavour with officials, a phenomenon that appears to be reflected in the high number of political sentences handed down in Xinjiang courts, particularly for certain groups of defendants. Incidentally, we should note that the regulation of 2001 was issued in March of that year, and was thus not a response to the events of 11 September. The tightening of religious policy in Xinjiang can be explained in the context of the fact that as terrorist attacks increased in the 1990s the Chinese authorities confirmed in 1996 that Uighur separatism had a marked religious dimension. In 1996 the first ‘Strike Hard’ campaign, targeting splittism and illegal religious activities, was launched. In 1997 a general ‘Rectification of Social Order’ campaign was launched in order to crush the Yinning Unrising. In 1998 a ‘People’s War’ against separatism followed Jiang Zemin’s inspection of Xinjiang. In 2000 a ‘Focused Rectification of Religious Places’ campaign was designed to obtain evidence and destroy proindependence elements that had engaged in terrorist activities. In 2001 a two-year‘Strike Hard’ campaign was launched. After 11 September a ‘Strike Hard, High Pressure’ campaign was launched against ‘separatists, religious extremists and terrorist forces’. The 2001 regulation came in the context of increased repression by the Chinese authorities, in whose eyes the concepts ‘separatism’, ‘religious extremism’ and ‘terrorist activity’ had become interchangeable. At the same time, however, the government needs the support of religion so that the enemies (the separatists) can be undermined. What is required is a stick-and-carrot policy. We now turn to the carrot side of the government’s ethno-religious policy. In 1953 the ten Islamic communities in China (including the Uighurs) were incorporated into the China Islamic Association, comparable to similar associations for the other four recognised religions (Protestantism, Catholicism, Daoism and Buddhism). Its stated tasks include assisting the people’s government in its implementation of the policy of freedom of religion, carrying forward the fine traditions of Islam, cherishing the motherland, and unifying Muslims in participating in socialist construction. The Association is obviously also a convenient vehicle for the government to supervise Muslim activities. Certain privileges are given to the Association in order to gain its support. In 1998 the China Islamic Association reported that with government support two national Islamic sermon-reading competitions and a Quran recitation had been organised, the Han- and Uighur-language editions of the journal Muslims of China improved, research in Islamic scholarship promoted, a concise edition of the Quran published and distributed, Islamic educational work strengthened and the guidance and management of Islamic theological education and regulation of theological colleges improved.

　　To what extent does the Association protect the interests of the Islamic communities? Perhaps a more precise question would be: which Islamic group benefits most from the activity of the Association? As noted above, there are conflicts in Xinjiang among different Islamic groups along ethnic, religious, urban-rural and territorial lines. One focus of the Association’s ‘united front’ activity is, paradoxically, on how to make use of the internal conflicts among the Islamic groups for the benefit of the government.

　　There are thus both ‘control’ and ‘united front’ aspects to the government’s religious policy. The government also attempts to integrate ‘patriotism’ into this policy, in the belief that patriotism can dilute ethno-religious identity and bring religion into line with government policies. A ‘patriotic’ element is prominent in religious education and leadership training. Islamic education takes place in the madrassah as well as in religious colleges. The former tends to be ethnic-oriented, and the government uses various methods to shift all training to the religious colleges. The government also conducts ‘religious training campaigns’ and ‘political re-education campaigns’. These are similar to the notorious ‘patriotic education campaign’ waged in Tibet against Buddhist monks and nuns since 1996. Since 2001 the frequency of these training campaigns has apparently increased from once every few years to once a year for the 8000 registered imams above the township level. The campaigns in 2001 and 2002 systematised the ideological control imposed on clerics. These sessions are purposely designed as loyalty tests. If clerics do not offer precise accounts of themselves they are viewed as insincere about opposing separatism. Clerics who do not fulfil the ideological criteria can be put through further ‘education sessions’ and have their accreditation suspended or removed. Patriotic education may not succeed in altering imams’ inner convictions, but it certainly acts as a force promoting self-regulation: imams know what they should and should not do. Since 11 September 2001 the vice-director of the office of the Xinjiang People’s Congress has come to the conclusion that those using literary or artistic means to distort historical facts have a responsibility for violent terrorist activities which have taken place in the past. One of his measures has been to accelerate the shift to all-Chinese education, with the introduction of the Chinese language at primary level and the decision to teach all courses at Xinjiang University in Chinese. The government explains that the aim of the introduction of Chinese as a language-medium is to improve the capacities of members of ethnic minorities. Wang Lequan, the secretary of the Xinjiang People’s Congress, says that

The languages of the minority nationalities have very small capacities and do not contain many of the expressions in modern science and technology, which makes education in these concepts impossible. This is out of step with the 21st century.

This language policy is likely to have the result that those who want to protect the Uighurs’ culture and identity will be pushed towards religion, and the role of religion may become more political in a sense of forming a ‘separated’ identity. Religion always has a role in maintaining and enhancing cultural identity.

　　Both Mao and Deng said that ideological questions cannot be solved by force or coercive measures; but the religious policy in Xinjiang relies heavily on both. It may control separatism, but it hardly wins the loyalty of the Uighurs. On the contrary, it in fact arouses their aspiration towards separatism. The Chinese authorities need to consider an ethno-religious policy based on the concept of coexistence rather than on patriotism and control. A policy based on coexistence involves respect instead of control, non-aggression instead of violence, dialogue instead of monologue. The concept of coexistence is difficult for those with a totalist vision. In the totalitarian world-view there are only two kinds of time: the time of totally dedicated struggle and the time of victory or defeat. The idea of coexistence creates a third, ‘in-between’ time, a hiatus during which one concedes that one will have to learn to live with the enemy ‘temporarily’. In reality, it may turn into a hiatus without end. As things stand, the Chinese understanding of ‘patriotism’ involves destroying the enemy, not coexisting with him. Current Chinese religious policy in Xinjiang seems hardly likely to create long-term stability.

An Evaluation

　　Maintaining stability is what most governments intend to achieve, and is also what people expect from their government. There is always room for debate, however, on what ‘stability’ means. Democracy to a large extent provides a system that can minimise conflicts without causing too much social instability and while preserving a large measure of trust in society. This kind of conflict management is not available to the Chinese authorities. As a result, violence becomes the means used by government and people alike. In Xinjiang the separatists use bomb attacks and killings, and in return the Chinese authorities use brutal suppression and torture. A totalitarian government may be able to keep conflicts in its country under control, but the established stability tends to be shallow and impermanent, for the underlying tensions are never faced. If the Chinese authorities do not initiate political reform, they will continue under the threat of instability, created to a large extent by the existing political system itself.

　　For the Chinese authorities, religion is never simply an ideological issue. If it were simply a matter of ideology, they would be able to change their attitude towards it, as they did over economics. According to communist ideology, capitalism means exploitation and alienation, but since the economic reform in 1979 capitalism has been gradually incorporated into Chinese socialism; according to Deng Xiaopeng, the result is socialism with Chinese characteristics. Recently the Chinese Communist Party opened up its membership to capitalists. There is no sign that this kind of change will take place as far as religion is concerned. This is because religion is basically a political issue rather than an ideological issue in China. On the one hand, religion has the potentiality to mobilise people and turn them into a social force against the government: Falun Gong is an example of this. On the other hand, ethnoreligious identity in Tibet and Xinjiang poses a direct threat to the state sovereignty of a nation. Chinese religious policy is thus always politically concerned and the question of violation of religious freedom as such is never an issue in China. Even though the Chinese authorities have gradually come to realise that religion can have a positive political role to play in socialist society, the nature of religious policy has not seen a significant change.

　　In the white paper Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China (2005) the Chinese authorities reaffirm the policy of self-government for the autonomous regions, including Xinjiang. The policy allows ethnic groups to manage their internal affairs independently in the autonomous areas and to formulate regulations for self-government and their own regulations respecting and guaranteeing freedom of religious belief and the use and development of spoken and written languages. Despite the fact that some ethnic groups, like the Tibetans, may accept autonomy in place of independence, the issue, however, is always to what extent these rights can be put into practice. Policy in fact demands that the patriotic spirit be the basis on which ethnic minorities practise regional autonomy and this implies that coexistence is never taken seriously. We thus need to question the meaning and purpose of autonomy. In the present situation, the rights of the ethnic group in question will always remain secondary to considerations of social cohesion and national security. The question remains whether a policy based on the need for stability can in fact produce society stability if justice is not a priority.

　　All indications suggest that the tension will remain between national identity and ethno-religious identity in China in the foreseeable future. The experience of some countries, such as Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, tells us that the tension may lead to civil war or fragmentation. Other experience, however, tells us that the tension can be handled peacefully and rationally, and that coexistence is possible. Does the Chinese political system have the potential to promote coexistence? Does religion have a contributive role to play? The consolidation of economic reforms and the rise of a new generation of pragmatic leaders at all levels of government in China bode well for the slow and gradual evolution of a political system that will allow for greater popular participation and autonomy for minority groups. In the long run, this indirect route to self-administration – relying on market forces and the gradual evolution of Chinese political institutions – may be a possible but very slow means to satisfy the nationalist yearnings of China’s minorities.

For a complete version of the paper, Please see Lap-Yan, Kung. "National Identity and Ethno-Religious Identity: A Critical Inquiry into Chinese Religious Policy, with Reference to the Uighurs in Xinjiang." Religion, State and Society, 34:4 (2006): 375-391