September, 2003

The Mythologisation of Hong Kong

Chan Sze-chi

(The author is a member of the Hong Kong Christian Institute management committee and an assistant professor of the Religion Dept. of Hong Kong Baptist University.)

Every society has its myths - ancient, contemporary, prophetic ones pointing respectively to the past, the present and the future. What I understand as myth is a special literary genre that acts as a grand discourse for a specific community; and as a grand discourse, myths have a number of characteristics: they utilise many symbols and much imagery; they use a great deal of hyperbolic words and become bloated or exaggerated; and they are innately ideological and political, sanctioning a certain politically or ideologically oppressive structure or arrangement. Moreover, as the myth for a human community, they are also deeply cultural and are capable of forming or reinforcing the cultural identity of the community. Imitating a famous Biblical motto, we can go so far as to say that "Man does not live by bread alone but by every myth we have created for ourselves or that have been imposed on us by others."

Hong Kong, as a significant politico-cultural community on the Pacific Rim, certainly has our own grand myth, which is directly related to our sense or quest or lack of identity or to our sense of economic and political insecurity or our politico-cultural uncertainty. What is remarkable, first of all, is that Hong Kong does not have a grand genesis myth, which is understandable. The Opium War was too infamous a historical episode to be used. Moreover, our 19th century history primarily belongs to the colonizers, who, however, did not have a great story to tell. The local Chinese people did not have an impressive genesis narrative either.

As a result of this lack of a genesis myth from our earlier history, the truly mythical story or history of Hong Kong consequently lies in the aftermath of World War II. This history is intertwined with the great divide of modern Chinese history, that of the Communist-Nationalist split of China into mainland and Taiwan, with Hong Kong becoming a colonial enclave caught between these two contesting powers. The mythical history of Hong Kong features then as a great survival myth. In addition to its relationship with mainland China and Taiwan, geopolitically, Hong Kong also became a contending ground between Communist China and Capitalist America. Colonial rule by the American ally Britain meant that Hong Kong inevitably became a pawn in this geopolitical struggle. Hong Kong, however, received many advantages or even coddling from this enviable position. Consequently, the people of southern China in Hong Kong survived, and survived vibrantly. As a result, the myth of a Hong Kong miracle began to take hold with Hong Kong seen as an economic dragon, which, in reality, was fundamentally dependent on U.S. geopolitical policy. (South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore also became economic dragons in the region during this period, and thus, Hong Kong was not unique.)

Hong Kong subsequently entered into a phase of political and economic transition. Hong Kong's ordeal during the transition to Chinese sovereignty has been particularly tumultuous and difficult, for China required Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" model to be a showcase to Taiwan to encourage its reunification with the mainland. China though is not culturally an open Westernised country, but rather, it is more of a Third World authoritarian country with a strong traditional culture, albeit eagerly looking forward to Westernisation and modernisation. This has determined the fundamental difficulty of Hong Kong's transition from colonial, Westernised rule to neo-colonial or semi-colonial or postcolonial de-Westernised rule. (Taiwan and South Korea also underwent comparable political and economic transitions - only Singapore was relatively stable. Both, together with Singapore, became high-tech regions during an upgrade of their industrial sector; both underwent political democratisation and liberalisation. Taiwan, in particular, suffered from the international isolation imposed by mainland China, and therefore, its achievements are, in fact, more remarkable than those of Hong Kong.)

During this same period, local economic development approached maturity, and a capitalist local mass culture began to develop, fostering Hong Kong's cultural lead over that of China. Mainland Chinese people though were eagerly chasing everything "Western," especially that which was easy to understand or digest - a quest for pseudo-Westernity and pseudo-modernity, which Hong Kong readily provided.

Hong Kong's economic development, however, began to diverge from the industrial upgrade path taken by the three other Asian dragons. Hong Kong turned to mainland China to act as the production base while Hong Kong transformed itself into a financial and service centre. During this period, Hong Kong's education system also underwent a great deal of transition with the proliferation and establishment of local training grounds for many professional fields - doctors, dentists, lawyers, social workers, journalists, surveyors, accountants, architects, engineers, computer experts, financial personnel and, certainly, teachers. Culturally, there was a further deepening of Western culture in Hong Kong: the rise of a Western lifestyle (yuppies and consumerism), of Western-style individualism and personal adventure (Lone Ranger tourism, Lone Ranger humanitarian participation, Lone Ranger journalism), of Western-style charity and environmental advocacy, of Western-style equality and democratic movement (anti-discrimination drives, feminism), of Western-style sexual and family behaviour (romance, cohabitation, divorce, homosexuality and sadomasochism).

The political transition ushered in a period of intricate political maneuvering between China and Britain. These developments, together with the 1989 Tiananmen incident, caused widespread unrest and fear of a would-be communist encroachment, and consequently, a massive outflow or emigration of talents ensued, an exodus that coincided with social experiments in some countries through immigration policy, especially Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. The great emigration experiment effectively ended, however, with the 1997 transition and the economic rise of mainland China. Many talents who had emigrated returned to Hong Kong to find their career prospects greatly diminished.

During this protracted period of transition, both Britain and China, together with the United States, engaged in a process of myth-making for the city and its people. Luxuriant praise was heaped on the city and the quality of its people as well as their achievements and prospects. This created a cultural bubble in Hong Kong, which was also fuelled by the real estate bubble of the early 1990s that, in turn, was produced by the inflation bubble caused by the currency peg and a restrictive land policy. Like all bubbles, these superficial conditions did not last forever. The economic high point of Hong Kong was already past in 1995 when the unemployment rate surged. The subsequent two years were a pre-transitional frenzy, especially in terms of an accelerated real estate bubble fuelled by an underground outflow of money from the mainland, which left Hong Kong's people disoriented and anxious.

What precisely is this central myth that has been propagated though? It is a myth that portrays Hong Kong as a world-class city and a metropolitan, free and entrepreneurial city. It depicts Hong Kong's success as the success of Western colonial rule, of capitalism, of freedom. It depicts Hong Kong's people as highly qualified and Westernised, as democratic and liberal, as well-educated and enlightened, as high-tech and information-rich, as professional and law-abiding, as creative and versatile. It depicts the Hong Kong government as clean and efficient, its civil servants as efficient and neutral, namely, "an invaluable asset of the city." It sees Hong Kong's geopolitical position as crucial and unrivalled and Hong Kong's future prospects as bright and secure.

Since the grand myth of Hong Kong was so successful and well-received, Hong Kong's people have undergone a traumatic post-transitional collapse of that myth. Bashing Hong Kong has now become a sport in the city. Interestingly, this has given rise to the anti-myth in which Hong Kong is seen as a city that is below standard and shallow, that is magnate-dominated with a lack of entrepreneurial spirit, that is expensive and complacent. Hong Kong's people are now seen as low quality, traditional and uncivilized; as passive, submissive and self-interested, if not uncultured and shortsighted; as unscientific and information-poor; as unprofessional and law-evading; as copycat and sterile. Hong Kong's youth are nowadays seen as pampered weaklings, their English standard appalling. Hong Kong's government is currently seen as inefficient and big-spending, its bureaucrats as bureaucratic, inflexible and incompetent. Hong Kong's geopolitical position is presently deemed peripheral and unnecessary, its appalling English proficiency does not merit it to be a bridge between East and West. With Hong Kong's competitiveness fast eroding, the pre-1997 Hong Kong is now seen as the golden age.

This rise of the anti-myth, in fact, belongs to the stocktaking of history after the 1997 transition. The central problem to be asked is, Has Hong Kong passed its golden age; is Hong Kong now in its middle-age years?

The past six years of post-1997 rule have seen a phenomenal mishandling, or non-handling, of a fine city by Tung Chee-hwa. As the chief executive of the government, he has been inept. He could not see through the grand myth but rather was fooled by it. He did not understand the collapse of this pre-1997 grand myth and was unable to create another myth to replace it. Although he did propose the myth that Hong Kong's fate is linked with that of China: "Bright future for China, bright future for Hong Kong!" Yet such a slogan is too vague to usher in a new mythologisation. Although posing himself as a good-natured Confucian leader, what he has done, in fact, is to dance to the dictates of the grand myth while trying his best to realise or reinforce it. In doing so, he has confused the "already" and the "not yet" dimensions of the myth. Thus, he embarked on many missteps to catapult Hong Kong to become a world-class city. There were many missteps on education (delinking university professionals from the government pay scale, tertiary education expansion), on economics and technology (Cyberport, the science park, government intervention in the market in 1998), on the financial sector (Mandatory Provident Fund [MPF], stock exchange reforms), on management (technological management, restructuring, value-enhancement). Many of these steps just squandered Hong Kong's precious financial reserves but did not help to realise the grand myth.

The reality of Hong Kong for the past six years has been a failed elitist system. This failure is amply shown in the SARS crisis, which featured a performing professional middle class and a non-performing ruling elite class. Yet the professional middle class is now facing an impending collapse or at least the reduction of its size, wealth and power. If the middle class cannot maintain itself, then the traditional upward mobility which has served the city so well will be in jeopardy. Tung and his failed political elites have not addressed this problem. With the dearth of really capable ruling elites, how should we go on? The last untested myth of Hong Kong is that its people are deprived: "If we are allowed to run our own affairs, then things may be fine." Is this belief true? At this point, we must note that recently both the professionals (including the medical professionals) and civil servants have not shown enough flexibility and commitment to the community as to allow their interests to be trimmed for the common good of Hong Kong. They have become selfish interest groups. With civil servants and professionals overpaid - expensive, but performing - how should we continue? Their behaviour seems to confirm part of the anti-myth. All in all, Hong Kong now suffers from a reality that is not congruent with its grand myth, yet it has not invented another grand myth thus far, and the anti-myth presently endures.